Summary
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Many people expect that wild animals, on the whole, tend to live bad lives due to the amount of suffering present in nature. Some have claimed that we therefore have reason to intervene in nature and prevent animal suffering. Against this, some philosophers argue that any intervention in nature, even if successful, would be wrong because it would violate animals’ freedom. The author objects to this argument on the grounds that respecting the freedom of wild animals still gives us reason to intervene in their lives to free them of factors which might diminish their agency and enrich their choices.
On expectation, most wild animals have lives of net suffering due to naturogenic causes. Some have claimed that concern for their well-being gives us reasons to intervene in nature on their behalf. Against this, it has been said that many interventions to assist wild animals would be wrong, even if successful, because they would violate their freedom. According to the Freedom-based Approach I defend in this paper, this view is misguided. Concern for wild animal freedom does indeed gives us reasons to secure these animals against control-undermining interferences, but also to intervene in nature in order to enrich their choices.