Summary
The first part of the report addresses the legislative history of the EATS Act, citing Proposition 2, the “California Egg Law” and the subsequent “King Amendment”, referenced as the prototype of the EATS Act.
The report then explains the “Commerce Clause”, which explicitly grants Congress the authority to regulate interstate commerce, while the “Dormant Commerce Clause” deals with the negative implication of this power – the implied prohibition for states to not create laws that discriminate against or unduly interfere with interstate commerce.
The Full Text of S.2019 / H.R.4417 is presented in pages13 and 14 and is followed by a section by section analysis.
In the section by section analysis, the authors explain the Act’s Section Two in three subsections. The authors firstly depict the problems with the Act’s definition of agricultural products, which they show to be vague and insufficient.
The authors provide a detailed consideration of Section Two subsection (b), in which the Act tends to reduce states’ power to control imported agricultural products sold within their areas, possibly violating the Tenth Amendment by prohibiting states from regulating imported agricultural products, including those that could pose risks to the health, safety, and well-being of their citizens. The Act would also limit the ability of states to impose additional standards on imported goods beyond those in the producing state. The authors also point out that the language in Section 2 raises complex questions about its interpretation and application, potentially leading to uncertain outcomes and varied judicial interpretations. The authors also comment on the paragraphs 1 and 2 of subsection 2(b), providing further critiques on how the Act was written.
In subsection 2(c), the authors continue to criticize the Act’s ambiguity and lack of objectivity. The Act works to decrease the states’ power of regulation and fails to provide objective regulations, burdening the states and local governments with an impossible logistical task. The result is the Act creating a federal bar to which local legislations must comply.
In Section 3, the authors’ analysis of subsection 3(b) considers the problems with the right of action and remedies provided in the Act, such as the vulnerability of local and state governments/officials to lawsuits, litigation and injunctions. Furthermore, the authors tackle again the Act’s lack of clarity, causing controversy over its interpretation.
For subsection 3(c), the authors evaluate the problems with the actions brought under subsection 3(b), such as the court time required to reach final decisions and their effect on many different areas of agriculture-related laws. Paragraph 3(c)(1) gives plaintiffs a more lenient standard for obtaining preliminary injunctions compared to typical federal court cases, even in civil rights situations. The authors cite that under paragraph 3(c)(2), states could use health and safety concerns to show “irreparable harm” by the Act, though it’s a high bar. Even if states could prove irreparable harm, a plaintiff can still get an injunction if the state can not simultaneously show a likelihood of winning under paragraph 3(c)(1).
In their critique of subsection 3(d), the authors state that the Act’s statute of limitations lacks objective criteria for it to be clearly applied.
Subsection 3(e) discusses jurisdiction and authors point to the possibility of massive litigation and the shift of power from states and local governments to federal judiciary.
The authors also discuss the application of the Act and its effect on several categories, such as (but not limited to) invasive pests and plant disease protections, zoonotic and infectious disease regulations, and food quality and safety regulations. Of particular relevance to animal welfare are the Acts’ effect on fishing regulations (enabling the practice of fishing without any of the regulations already established by the states) and horse slaughter laws (the Act could enable states to regulate and allow for the import of horses for slaughter with no minimum welfare or transport standards).